India-Pakistan-Afghanistan: Shifting Dynamics Since the Taliban’s Return

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The article analyses the evolving dynamics between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India following the Taliban takeover in 2021. Growing Afghanistan-Pakistan hostilities, coupled with deepening Afghanistan-India engagement, have significantly altered the regional landscape. This transformation demands a strategic recalibration from all three countries.

Introduction

The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 marked a major turning point in South Asian politics. The shift was seen as a strategic victory for Pakistan due to its historical linkages with the Taliban group. The ISI-Taliban nexus was long viewed as a source of regional instability. However, evolving dynamics since the takeover have produced persistent tensions between the two countries. Afghanistan’s uncompromising stance on the Durand Line and its reluctance to restrain the cross-border activities of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have led to recent confrontations along the border, which Pakistan has described as an "open war"

Conversely, Kabul’s growing diplomatic and humanitarian engagement with India has generated fears of strategic encirclement in Islamabad. In a recent episode, Pakistan’s Defense minister, Khawaja Asif, accused the Taliban of turning Afghanistan into a "colony of India". For India, what initially appeared to be a major strategic setback may now offer a potential avenue to regain its strategic footprint in the region. However, this geopolitical maneuvering presents both opportunities and risks, underscoring the need for a carefully recalibrated approach.

Taliban-Pakistan Relations: From confluence to Divergence

The emergence of the Taliban regime in the 1990s was undoubtedly a major success of the Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan. However, the 2001 US invasion created a strategic dilemma for Islamabad, which required the country to pursue dual engagement policy. It forced Pakistan to side with US interests in Afghanistan while maintaining relations with the Taliban at the same time. Islamabad had a vested interest in keeping good diplomatic relationships with multiple actors; however, the strategy created an atmosphere of distrust within the Taliban ranks. Thus, Pakistan's influence on the group started to decline progressively until, following the re-emergence of the Taliban in power in 2021, Pakistan saw its relationship with Afghanistan deteriorate rapidly and become extremely strained.

The major source of friction lies in the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, a terrorist organization designated by the United Nations and focused on the ousting of the current Pakistani regime and establishment of Sharia rule. The growing presence of TTP militants inside Afghanistan reflects the limits of Islamabad's influence over the Taliban. Despite numerous denials issued by the Taliban, a 2024 report by the United Nations indicated evidence of support and coordination of activities with TTP militants. However, the Taliban refuses to act against the terrorist group because it fears an uprising and defection to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Common feelings about Pashtun nationalism and ideological similarities also play a role in collaboration between both the Taliban groups. This demonstrates the complicated nature of the conflict that goes beyond just security matters and deals with issues of identity and ethnic politics.

The situation is worsened by rising discontent over the controversial Durand Line . The border, which was drawn up in 1893 during British rule, is a major source of dispute between the two countries. To this day, no Afghan government has accepted the legitimacy of this border , leading to various confrontations along the border, especially in recent years. But the problem has escalated from episodic strikes to open warfare between the two sides. On February 27th, tensions worsened considerably as Pakistan carried out multiple airstrikes on Afghanistan in and around Kabul and Kandahar. The strikes resulted in an attack by Afghanistan on Pakistani security personnel, which Taliban authorities said was a response to deadly incidents earlier that week.

As the level of hostility continues to escalate, stability becomes even more unlikely. Apart from the latest conflict there are more fundamental and structural issues which are rooted in history and different strategic considerations rather than being a passing problem. Without meaningful consensus-building, the conflict is likely to persist and this is bound to affect regional stability and displacement of civilians in the border regions. Therefore, these tensions may require an immediate ceasefire and sustained diplomatic engagement aimed at preventing future escalations and establishing a long-term security framework.

India-Afghanistan Relations: From Strategic Setback to Pragmatic Engagement

Over the past two decades, India has followed a development and people-centric approach towards Afghanistan through projects related to infrastructure and humanitarian initiatives, reflecting its soft power strategy . But the emergence of the Taliban in 2021 altered the regional dynamics and created strategic challenges for India. As a result, India adopted a ‘wait and watch’ approach to deal with the changing environment in Afghanistan, signalling a strategic recalibration in its policy.

Immediately after the takeover, India suspended its embassy operations in Kabul as a result of security apprehensions and historical distrust towards the Taliban. Notwithstanding the initial reluctance, India decided to engage the Taliban through limited means, such as sending a technical delegation to Kabul in June 2022. This was done out of pragmatic realization that maintaining India’s strategic interests in the region would be possible only through some degree of engagement with the Taliban. For instance, in the last few years, India has provided significant humanitarian aid in the form of food grains and medicines. There is also considerable trade activity amounting to over $1 billion in bilateral trade in 2025. India practices the policy of “engagement without recognition” whereby the Indian government tries to build economic ties without recognizing the Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

The most recent examples include the visit of the Afghan Foreign minister to India in October 2025 and subsequently, that of the country’s trade minister in November 2025. The discussions centred on enhancing diplomatic relations, fostering economic cooperation, and increasing connectivity. Such interactions highlight Kabul’s attempts to establish new alliances and obtain economic assistance following the deterioration in economic conditions since the Taliban takeover of power. In turn, the actions taken by New Delhi constitute pragmatic diplomacy aimed at securing Indian interests while slowly but steadily establishing a presence in an area traditionally dominated by Pakistan’s strategic depth.

While there are many possibilities presented through increased engagement, India must deal with certain limitations. First, the existence of militant organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, responsible for attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, represents a threat to India’s security concerns. Second, the sustained fragility of Afghanistan’s security corridor may create difficulties in pursuing economic goals in terms of increased trade and connectivity. Third, the controversial nature of the Taliban regime may provoke international criticism alongside domestic ideological opposition, which was witnessed during Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India in October 2025.

Conclusion

Amid continued international isolation, the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan has made increasing attempts to engage in its immediate neighborhood. Economic and humanitarian concerns have forced the group to diversify its engagements. Though endowed with natural resources and geographic advantages, the economy of Afghanistan is largely underutilized. These factors combined with worsening relationship with Pakistan explains the Taliban’s increasing effort to engage with India.

The recent conflicts involving the two countries can be partly understood in the context of growing ties between the Taliban regime and India. However, resorting to coercion will not bring any desired results for Pakistan and will only complicate its position. It is necessary for Pakistan to solve the border conflicts with the help of diplomacy and regional cooperation. In addition, instead of accusing India for all its problems, Pakistan should confront its internal failures. Decades of policies nurturing militant groups have resulted in grave consequences for Islamabad, leading to emergence of terrorist groups like the TTP. Thus, a major shift in Pakistan's foreign policy is essential for a peaceful and stable regional environment.

For India, the current situation creates both threats and opportunities due to the strategic complexity of recent conflict. The first major step is to consolidate the advantage of the current developments and use this opportunity to strengthen ties with Afghanistan through various aspects such as political, humanitarian, and economic cooperation. At the same time, India must ensure that no anti-India elements remain inside the territory of Afghanistan and that the ongoing conflict does not spillover into the Kashmir region.

By Rudransh Bansal

Rudraksh Bansal is a Political Science (Hons.) graduate from Satyawati College, University of Delhi, and an incoming M.A. (Diplomacy, Law and Business) student at the Jindal School of International Affairs. He brings an unusual blend of interest to his work, combining geopolitics and foreign policy with a deep passion for poetry.