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Introduction
With the India Against Corruption (IAC) movement gaining momentum in the early 2010s, Anna Hazare initiated a fast-unto-death to demand the establishment of an Anti-Corruption body. As the movement gained traction and media coverage, on the fourth day of the fast, the government succumbed to Hazare’s demands, prompting him to call off the fast. Claiming victory, Arvind Kejriwal, the media spokesperson of the IAC, hailed it as a triumph for the people of India.
In hindsight however, numerous questions emerge regarding the protest's essence and its implications for a liberal democracy; while it may be dismissed as just another campaign, its populist rhetoric, appealing directly to the people and purportedly speaking on their behalf, renders it significant. However, this characteristic is not unique to the IAC – it mirrors a growing trend observed in democracies worldwide since the late twentieth century, from the campaign of Ross Perot to Donald Trump. Hence, in the context of the ‘New Populist’ movements, delving into the phenomenon of what is often pejoratively labeled as Populism becomes imperative, along with its implications for liberal democracies and political obligation at large.
Concerned with the ambiguities within the notion of popular sovereignty, Margaret Canovan in her book, "The People," delves into historical and conceptual understandings of the sovereign people, who have collectively held and exercised authority in Western political thought since the times of the Roman Empire. Despite playing a prominent role in political imagination, she highlights that the collective notion of the people has often lacked clarity in conception due to conflicting fears and aspirations, resulting in numerous complications in modern democracy. One such complication is the phenomenon of ‘populism’. Departing from what she terms the ‘Two-strand theory of democracy’, Canovan argues that the significance of populism lies in the necessity of considering the people as a collective more seriously. While acknowledging her contribution to the analysis of the people, I believe there is merit in delving deeper into the implications of the ‘two-strand theory’ itself to better understand the phenomenon of ‘populism’.
In working within this framework, I seek to examine precisely this - what are the twin ambiguities that result in populism and what implications does it have on the question of political obligation. This paper consists of three parts - the first part seeks to offer a conceptual understanding of populism and how it reflects the ambiguity in popular sovereignty, as articulated by Canovan. The second part delves into the ‘two-strand theory’ of modern democracy and highlights another ambiguity in what constitutes modern democracy, as well as how it is reflected in populism. In the third part, I situate populism amidst the twin ambiguities and bring out its implications for the question of political obligation.
Part I – Conceptualizing Populism and the First Ambiguity
To thoroughly explore the ambiguities leading to populism, it is first crucial to establish an understanding of populism. Canovan defines populism by its chief feature, namely, the appeal to the notion of the people as the ultimate source of authority. Additionally, Urbinati identifies populism with several other attributes, including the presence of a charismatic leader, an oversimplified understanding of democracy, a reification of the people, and a distortion in the functioning of representative democracy, among others. Using this definition, the common view of democracy is to see it as a delicate combination of two strands: populist democracy and liberal constitutionalism, with populism often perceived as disrupting this balance. However, Canovan critiques the Two-strand theory, arguing that it exaggerates the gap between the two strands and, in doing so, distracts attention from the real issue, which she identifies as the ambiguity surrounding ‘the people’.
The notion of the sovereign people originates from Rousseau and his The Social Contract, where it was posited that the state derives its authority to govern from the consent of the people conceived as a collective. This consent is expressed through the General Will, which represents the collective will and grants legitimacy to the state through it enjoying popular sovereignty, or the people’s collective consent; when the state acts contrary to the General Will, it forfeits this legitimacy, no longer representing a legitimate authority. However, alongside this concept, the historical conception of ‘the people’ has always had an underlying fear of the irrational mob, creating tension within popular sovereignty. Both the notion of popular sovereignty as well as this tension are visible in modern democracy in processes such as elections and referendums, and the fear among the governing-elite classes of most states.
Within this context, the issue of populism arises. Populists exploit this tension within the people; drawing on Carl Schmitt’s concepts of ‘friend and foe’, they depict the people in various ways, framing them as the suppressed masses against the elite, thereby perverting the original conception of popular sovereignty. While populism often tends toward majoritarianism, it also relies on more simplistic notions of good versus bad, such as the exploited people versus the corrupt elite, as seen in the IAC protests. Canovan identifies this malady of reification of the people and suggests that the solution lies in obtaining a clearer understanding of ‘the sovereign people’. It is this which is referred to as the ambiguity of the sovereign people.
This paper makes a consideration to Canovan’s argument – the common view has been to always associate popular sovereignty with democracy; however, this is not necessarily true. Historical examples, most notably Nazi Germany, demonstrate that popular sovereignty has legitimized absolutist states in the past as well. However, in modern democracies, this tendency is mitigated by popular sovereignty coexisting with the institutions and processes of representative democracy. As Urbinati puts it, it is this sense of representation which has facilitated the democratic transformation of states.
Therefore, given this consideration, while concurring with Canovan’s argument regarding the ambiguity of the people, I propose that it is worthwhile to delve deeper into the connection between popular sovereignty and representative democracy itself. I suggest another ambiguity exists within the two strands of democracy, popular sovereignty and liberal constitutionalism, which can help us better understand populism. Hence, a closer examination of the two-strand theory is necessary to understand how populism operates through the ambiguity that exists between them.
Part II – Constituents of Democracy and the Second Ambiguity
While the modern state reached its final form around the mid-twentieth century with the evolution of representative democracy and universal adult franchise, its roots can be traced back to the American and French Revolutions. The former, influenced by the legacy of Hobbes and Locke, heralded ‘liberal constitutionalism’ which conceptualized the state through the constitution - a contract that delineates the relationship between the people and the sovereign. The latter, drawing upon Rousseau's ideas, brought in the notion of ‘popular sovereignty’, which expanded this contractarian understanding of political obligation by introducing a sense of ethos into the resulting republic; the state is not merely a product of the contract but also of the collective will of the people, operating based on the popular consent it enjoys.
Although not definitive, these two ideas of political obligation roughly constitute the two strands that define democracy. The two-strand theory thus reflects these two notions that characterize modern democracy. The pertinent question that arises in this context is - how should we perceive these two strands and how are they articulated in democratic discourse?
While it is possible to identify the two strands historically, it becomes hazy when attempting to identify them conceptually. Although originating from different intellectual underpinnings, both strands are often manifested together in a democracy. For example, going back to the IAC movement, when its popular slogan alleges ‘Mera Neta Chor Hain’ (My leader is a Thief), it articulates both strands of political obligation - on the one hand, the Neta has authority since they are in a contract to perform their constitutional duties. Thus, when they go beyond that agreed contract, and engage in corruption, for example, the Neta has broken this constitutional obligation that people had towards them, reflecting Locke’s notion of ‘liberal constitutionalism’. On the other hand, the Neta also has authority as they represent the general will of the people. Therefore, in engaging in corruption, they have broken this obligation they exercised from the people. As is observed here, it is difficult to visualize the difference between them because the roles they play occupy different spaces in our conceptualization of democracy, thus becoming challenging to identify their mode of articulation.
Having established the presence of both strands, the question now arises as to how populism operates within the two-strand theory. Due to the lack of clarity regarding the role both strands play in our conceptualization of democracy, it is uncertain how much populists rely on one strand or another to legitimize their actions. This uncertainty enables them to seemingly change aspects of representative processes while remaining within the democratic framework. Taking elections as an illustration, they become a ritual that celebrates the authentic people that constitute the ‘Us’ rather than the process of representative democracy that it is meant to be. Its motivating principles of liberal constitutionalism are supplanted by the imperative to demonstrate the “true majority's” validity, not merely numerically but also ethically. In effect, elections then operate more like plebiscites that serve to prove the authentic people rather than to elect a new leader. Similarly, many of the fundamental ideas that constitute modern democracy are redefined in this manner, leading to what Urbinati calls the ‘transfiguration of democratic procedure’. In this process of redefinition, populists stretch representative democracy to its limits without actually dismantling it and it is this parasitic relationship which distinguishes it from fascism. Despite contradicting many principles of liberal constitutionalism and undermining the processes of representative democracy, populists still rely on them for legitimacy by operating within the democratic framework.
Thus, the principal observation made so far is that it is possible to compromise on one strand, namely liberal constitutionalism, and rely on the other, namely popular sovereignty, for legitimacy. As seen from the illustrations of the IAC slogan and election, this is possible primarily because there exists a lack of clarity between the two strands in different aspects. Firstly, there is ambiguity regarding the place they occupy in our conceptualization of modern democracy. Secondly, it is unclear as to how much they contribute to legitimacy and political obligation. And thirdly, there is uncertainty about how they are articulated in political discourse and processes. It is precisely this observation which I identify as the ambiguity within the two-strand theory.
Image Credits - The Bosses of the Senate by Joseph Keppler
Part III – Twin Ambiguities and the Question of Political Obligation
It is thus established that the phenomenon of populism operates between the axes of the twin ambiguities of the popular sovereign, as articulated by Canovan, and of the two-strand theory, as laid out in this paper. Understanding populism is therefore, to understand how both ambiguities are simultaneously exploited, where the former is reified in terms of an Us-versus-Them binary and the latter is changed by compromising on one strand (liberal constitutionalism) while hardening reliance on the other (popular sovereignty).
With this framework of populism, it is now imperative to think of the implication populism has on our larger understanding of political obligation; how does it challenge mainstream liberal notions of why a citizen must obey the state?
Liberal thought, defined by social contractarian and individualistic principles conceptualizes a rational, consenting individual who enters into a contract with society and then the state, who, due to their enjoyment of benefits, must also consent to the burdens of obeying the state, thus defining the individual’s obligation vis-a-vis the state. This broad understanding of political obligation encompasses several aspects that justify obedience to the state; with the ones relevant for our consideration being firstly, the contract itself and secondly, its instrumental nature. The former refers to the understood, assigned limits and tasks that are placed on the sovereign in exchange for freedom. The latter is a description of the obligation that one has to the state – a non-emotive, rational decision made by evaluating one’s benefits and burdens in giving up their freedom.
Based on the inferences made from the functioning of populism from the twin ambiguities, it can be said that the phenomenon of populism disrupts at a larger level, the conception of the rational-consenting individual, and more specifically, both the totality of the contract and the its instrumental nature. An underlying assumption in liberal thought has been to think of obligation solely through the contract which alone defines one’s obligation to the state. What phenomena like populism bring to light is that one’s obligation is often defined in other loyalties independent of the contract such as an irrational attachment to identifying with the ‘Us’. More specifically, however, this also means that the contract as a means of visualizing obligation becomes to an extent redundant, in the sense that it cannot entirely capture why one would obey the state. With this introduction of the Us-Them binary, what populism effectually does is to invoke a sense of belonging, regardless of the nature of identification, as the IAC movement shows. In this sense, the state is not thought of as an instrument through which the ambitions of self-concerning individuals can be materialized, but rather a state for the “true majority,” whose identity is defined by the Us-Them binary.
Concluding Remarks
By using Canovan’s framework of understanding populism and the ambiguity of the sovereign people, I have examined the two-strand theory of democracy in order to underline the second ambiguity between populist democracy and liberal constitutionalism. In this manner I have attempted to place populism amidst the axes of the two ambiguities, thus underlying the implications it has on the larger question of political obligation. To conclude, this paper has underscored and expanded on Canovan’s concerns. Populist movements such as the IAC are reflective movements in democracies which prompt us to delve deeper into what the concept of "the people" truly represents, which strands modern democracies operate on, and how we should perceive our obligation to the state.
By Mohamed Thahir Sulaiman
I am a second year B.A. L.L.B (Hons) student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. I am passionate about history, society and constitutional law.
References
Canovan, Margaret. 2005. The People. Polity Press.
Klosko, George. 1987. “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (Summer): 241-259.
Urbinati, Nadia. 2019. Me the People: How Populism Transforms Democracy. Harvard University Press.
Jeelani, Mehboob. 2011. “The Insurgent” The Caravan, May 10, 2024. https://caravanmagazine.in/reportage/insurgent.
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