The Deal That Could Make or Break Iran’s Dream of Nuclear Power

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the Iran nuclear deal, has been considered as one of the most important moments of the current century, which at that stage of time was considered as a deal which improved international relations between the signatory nations. Signed on July 2015, and coming into effect on 16 January 2016, between Iran and the elder powers of the world, including the USA which supported the agreement, it was believed that it would help prevent the revival of the Iranian nuclear weapons programme and would help in reducing the estimates of the conflict between Iran and its provincial competitors and enable Iran to regain entry into mainstream global politics. However, a time more distant the JCPOA has become not only a model of negotiation but also a lesson of what trust can and should not do in international politics.

To gain the complete importance of JCPOA, it is important to know first its geopolitical background. The very word, geopolitics, signifies that the territorial boundaries of the country determine whether the country will experience economic or military assistance in its endeavour to determine its relationships with other states, as well as their foreign policy. To use an example, Iran has on one hand a reward and bad luck since it is located at the centre of the Middle East, sharing its borders with unstable countries, enjoying good access to the Strait of Hormuz, and possessing the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. This combination makes it the key and highly controversial issue in international affairs.

The JCPOA was not just about atomic technology, but it was more about Iran’s tactical position, vulnerable or steadied local and global equilibrium of power. In its centre, the JCPOA agreement was a non-proliferation agreement, which meant that it was an agreement via which no new state would be made a nuclear state, and the said treaty was a landmark international agreement which aimed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and work towards nuclear disarmament, signed in the year 1968.

According to the deal, Iran agreed not to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and also took measures to facilitate only civil work in their three nuclear facilities and also limited the number of centrifuges which it can operate. With that, it also limited the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium, along with it, the most significant aspect of the deal to which Iran agreed was that it would implement a protocol that would allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency unencumbered access to its nuclear facilities and to conduct regular checks and balances to verify whether Iran is complying with the deal or not. Also, these measures prolonged its breakout time, the projected period desirable to produce enough material for one nuclear bomb, from just a few months to roughly a year.

The deal taught us some lessons, which are worth revisiting such as the technical verification elements works as the clause of timely inspections and limitations against enrichment were not merely some trifling elements of the bureaucracy, but generated measurable checks and created space of predictable behaviour, this breathing space was important because it focused on the possibility of sudden disastrous escalation, and secondly the exchange element, as much as verification, where both the Iranian and the international communities have seen tangible economic gains and transparency.

Thirdly, treaties must have political endurance; a deal that functions whilst the government endures can nonetheless break down the instant domestic politics shift in a powerful state of the partnership. Fourthly, Regional politics are not peripheral; they are central. The tactical interests of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other regional players feed back into the discussions and can either result in or prevent these international steals into finalised, legal means such as snapback clause and sunset provisions, which can enforce obedience, but can also turn out to be sources of intensification when trust disintegrates. Especially with contemporary times, and with the change of political powers from Obama to Trump, the trust in international agreements has been curtailed with Trump’s withdrawal in 2018, leading to crippling currency of Iran due to sanctions imposed to come into the agreement.

Impact on the collapsing deals can already be felt on many fronts, and it is not confined to centrifuges and uranium shocks, but instant human cost impacts, and so are the revenues of states and jobs, and swelling of complaints continues to rise, at the point of redesigning domestic politics. Such tensions in the socioeconomic environment tend to reinforce hard-hitting narratives that represent exterior pressures as a leading source of poverty, which permits the government to unify its force under the flag of combat.

Politically, a great damage to nonstop verification is that insecurity breeds fear, and in security matters, fear is the raw material of inaccuracy of inspection when inspectors cannot trace actions or even fill the gaps and knowledge with worst-case anticipations, which is the riskiest state in foreign policy since it concentrates the wrath of pre-emptive strikes and escalation reactions. The action of players in the future will make or break the deal, depending on whether Iran will deliver on its commitment to prove and phase compliance and whether the outside powers will offer reliable and consistent relief; then the agreement can bring tangible benefits. 

Economic regularisation reduces internal burden, broadens investment capabilities, provides moderate political fundamentals within the country with space to navigate this scenario, and assists Iran by connecting it to the outside markets and reducing temptations to hedge by displaying military prowess, but there exists an alternative and equally likely way.  If the punishment imposed is still harsh in nature or the relief they provide is either revoked or reversed due to political reasons, Iran will further pursue self-help policies. Such sticklers find credibility in the fact that planned independence and a strong military are the only ways to defend the country. By eliminating the monitoring outline but retaining the threat of penalty, you introduce a strong incentive to Iran to accelerate those programs that would otherwise remain confined in the short term. The JCPOA is conditional in its value, as it helps so long as it continues to bring benefits; it destroys predictions should it become a political instrument to be used on and off.

On the international front the implication is chilling, not only the corrosion costs of the deal will make the adequacy of negotiated security arrangements more questionable in the future but also states that think complex deals will insist upon more institutional arrangements or less dependence on political commitments, second implementation destruction caused by world powers that do not accept joint decision degrades planning of multifaceted organisations and this makes penalties and implementation collaged business instead of the integrated tools, which undermines their effectiveness and destroys that belief in shared security tools, third failure of this nature locally increase the chances of secret operations, proxy escalation and inaccuracy. In cases, neighbours arrive at the judgment that nuclear-powered latent is drawing, the strain to obtain the dissuasion capacities increases, fourth, the blowout of the humanitarian and financial wave will not be contained within Iran within the energy market, investment flows, and larger international trade systems, so international stability will not be safe.

A snapback of sanctions followed by the subsequent move by Iran to withhold cooperation with the nuclear wing of the UN (IAEA) typifies a twist of events in this narrative. As per my perception, this arrangement constitutes escalation of circumstances by vindictive reaction as opposed to careful, calculated design. The snapback itself was to be an implementation tool, but as soon as it was used, it hardened spots and peeled off enticements to immediate help. The foreign minister of Iran gave an account of the decision to withdraw cooperation in terms of sovereignty and stand against what he termed as intimidation. It is a reasonable rhetoric that sanctions are suspended and reinstated later; it is the argument that Iran can have faith in subsequent concessions. It is quite weak but still insincere, denying that Iran's monitoring will kill the device that will translate faith in a sanctuary of openings.

The comments of a foreign minister can be interpreted, in my opinion, as grievance and strategic signaling since the giving up of the agreement strengthens the national position of Iran as an unwillingness to be burdened outside, and at the same time limits the flexibility of diplomats. When the Iranian state wants to stabilise its finances over a long period, the terminations of scrutiny would be indivisible, but when the aim is the immediate control and deterrence, it can be used successfully, but it isolates further and increases the chances of war in the future. In crux, the termination of the IAEA is the immediate internal benefit at a very high strategic price.

However actual actions are required to prevent the most perilous events, any course of actions needs to be integrated with confronted exchange, and laid down defences which might reduce the possibility of a single party inundating the entire agreement, It can be done in phases, the first phase can comprise of assurance building which must be immediate and verifiable with limited renewal of examinations and clear reporting in exchange for targeted, reversible financial reprieve can reconstruct confidence incrementally.

Second, precaution should be institutionalised to shield critical facets of relief, such as access to frozen resources against temporary political swings, possibly through multiple escrow mechanisms with clear technical triggers. Third, provincial security subtleties cannot be an addendum; simultaneous talks must be conducted amongst recent actors aimed at confidence building and risk lessening that would decrease the inducements for competitive nuclear hedging. Lastly, confirmation bodies must be authorised operationally and politically so they can function autonomously from everyday politics in the countries.

According to my viewpoint, the JCPOA, despite its defects, remains the most real-world outline ever attained to hold Iran’s nuclear power motivation. It is demonstrated that provable restrictions and reciprocal inducements can bring real curb when political determination exists. Its failure was not a mechanical failure but a political one, showing how delicate agreements became when they cannot endure change in leadership. The deal can still profit Iran and the region, but only if forthcoming promises are protected from reversal and affixed in lasting trustworthiness.

Finally, I would like to conclude by stating that continuity-less diplomacy is ultimately worthless. Provided the international society really desires to prevent a nuclear arms race it must forge the covenants that outlive amicable elections and supported by the tools that cannot be shaken by political compromises without strength, the planet will not be kept in a row of discussion and disintegration and ordinary men are the ones that must pay the price of real growth is the steady strides of solidarity, forgiveness and reciprocity and not momentary displays of shifting power. 

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 By Devansh Bansal

Devansh Bansal is a dedicated law student at Symbiosis Law School, Nagpur. He has a keen interest in International relations, Intellectual property rights and media and entertainment law.