After Hasina: How Bangladesh's February Election Completes India's Encirclement"

Introduction

Early August 2024 saw a helicopter land at Hindon Air Base in India. Inside sat Sheikh Hasina, once the head of government in Bangladesh, escaping after waves of unrest grew too intense to control. This moment marked the end of a political era, fifteen years shaped by close alignment with Indian interests. The shift came not through election, but upheaval. Power slipped away amid chaos rather than ceremony.

Now, five months have passed, yet Hasina still stays in India, officially detained, effectively stuck. In Dhaka, politics looks nothing like before. Authorities demand her return to serve a death penalty tied to grave human rights violations. Still, this legal standoff only shows one piece of a deeper unraveling: Delhi’s influence over Dhaka is fading fast, without any clear path to recovery.

Few dates carry as much weight as February 12. On that day, millions in Bangladesh head to the polls, where early numbers point strongly toward a commanding victory for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, originally formed in opposition to perceived Indian influence. 

According to a January 2026 EASD poll, the BNP commands 70 percent support among surveyed voters, while Jamaat-e-Islami holds 19 percent. Absent entirely is Hasina’s Awami League, once India’s closest partner; barred from running after being charged with terror-related activities, it has vanished from active politics

India risks more than just a single allied regime. Over a decade and a half of joint efforts on terrorism, exchange of intelligence, yet coordinated strategy now faces collapse. Even worse, the outcome may give Beijing the missing link to lock in a full ring around India; ports paired with alliances running westward through Pakistan toward Bangladesh in the east.

The Golden Era Ends

What Hasina offered India went beyond what earlier Bangladeshi figures dared attempt. Training sites once used openly by insurgent factions such as the United Liberation Front of Asom vanished under her watch. Her government sent back key organizers - Anup Chetia, one founder of ULFA, was handed over after nearly two decades detained inside Bangladesh. By agreeing to the 2015 border settlement, access routes long desired by India finally became possible.

Back-and-forth intelligence sharing reached unprecedented depths. Although Beijing proposed building naval facilities, Hasina rejected the offer outright. That moment made India believe a reliable regional partner was finally within reach.

Things unraveled fast after that. Student-led demonstrations in early July challenged employment quotas. Come August, the movement shifted direction entirely, now targeting Hasina’s tightening control. On August fifth, a critical moment arrived when soldiers refused orders to suppress crowds. With support gone, escape became her only path forward.

Taking charge as interim leader, Muhammad Yunus made a telling choice early. Instead of heading to New Delhi first, he went to Beijing. By November, Bangladesh’s tribunal for international crimes had issued a death sentence against Hasina. The government in Dhaka now demands her return. Sending her would force India to abandon its constitutional stance on the death penalty. Still, holding on to her invites resentment from whichever side prevails next month. Every option carries weight. A clear path forward does not exist.

February 12: A Hostile Government Takes Power

The vote merely confirms a widely seen shift: New Delhi’s influence in Bangladesh is fading fast. Opposing perceived dominance by its giant neighbor shaped the BNP’s identity over many years. From London, where he has lived since 2008, Tarique Rahman leads the party remotely. Recently, his tone shifted, distancing from allies like Jamaat-e-Islami, once closely tied to the group. Now, he insists Bangladeshi soil will not host actions aimed at harming India.

Yet promises cost nothing, while support within his party remains untouched. Only months ago, figures from the BNP took part in efforts to isolate India economically. Since the banning of the Awami League through counterterrorism measures, New Delhi finds itself without any ally to engage. Still, old loyalties quietly endure beneath the surface.

Hard and sudden come the real-world effects. When the Ganges agreement comes up for review, renewal on good terms seems unlikely. Stalled since 2011, chances for reviving the Teesta River pact have vanished completely. Along a border stretching 4,096 kilometers, cooperation once needed now gives way to rising flows of smuggling and human trafficking.

Above everything else, rebel bases have reappeared. By early 2025, Indian intelligence reports confirmed activity once more at ULFA training sites in Bangladesh, sites closed under Hasina's orders years earlier. Geography works against India’s northeast; these regions link to mainland India solely via the tight passage known as the Siliguri Corridor. Should those movement permissions given by Hasina disappear, places such as Tripura may lose access entirely. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s Hindu community, making up 8 percent of people there, faces growing threats - threats that might push large numbers across borders into West Bengal and Assam.

China Completes the Circle

Yet this isn't some decades-old master plan unfolding with chess-master precision. China's approach is adaptive, seizing opportunities rather than manufacturing them. Beijing didn't engineer Hasina's ouster or convince the Maldives to expel Indian troops—it simply stood ready when those moments arrived. The String of Pearls emerged less from grand strategy than accumulated opportunism: filling financing gaps India couldn't or wouldn't close, offering infrastructure without political conditions, maintaining engagement with governments India chose to isolate. The pattern creates encirclement, but the method is responsive rather than orchestrated.Bangladesh closes the circle. By 2024, Chinese money built 12 highways across the country, erected 21 bridges, and powered 27 electrical plants—all part of a $42 billion infrastructure spree. When the World Bank pulled funding for the Padma Bridge over corruption concerns, China stepped in. Half the money for the Bangabandhu Tunnel came from China Exim Bank, now linking directly to Chittagong Port. Beijing even bought a quarter of the Dhaka Stock Exchange for $119 million, effectively gaining a window into Bangladesh's financial transactions.

Bangladesh closes the circle. By 2024, Chinese money built 12 highways across the country, erected 21 bridges, and powered 27 electrical plants—all part of a $42 billion infrastructure spree. When the World Bank pulled funding for the Padma Bridge over corruption concerns, China stepped in. Half the money for the Bangabandhu Tunnel came from China Exim Bank, now linking directly to Chittagong Port. Beijing even bought a quarter of the Dhaka Stock Exchange for $119 million, effectively gaining a window into Bangladesh's financial transactions.

The trade numbers reveal the dependency: Bangladesh buys $23 billion worth of Chinese goods yearly while selling back a mere $700 million. This one-sided relationship gives Beijing enormous leverage. Yunus's March 2025 trip to Beijing netted $1.9 billion in fresh commitments, with $400 million earmarked specifically for upgrading Mongla Port. Economic control opens doors to military positioning.

This economic penetration translates to military access. Bangladesh's armed forces rely on Chinese submarines, tanks, and aircraft, creating maintenance dependency. Chittagong and Mongla ports, under Chinese development, could provide the naval access Beijing has long sought in the Bay of Bengal. With a BNP government likely to be more receptive to Chinese overtures than Hasina ever was, February 12 could mark the day China completes its encirclement of India—from Gwadar in the west to Chittagong in the east, with Hambantota and the Maldives closing the southern arc.

Yet Bangladesh is not simply a pawn on China's chessboard. The country's political culture carries deep nationalist currents and historical wariness of external domination—whether from Pakistan, India, or China. Even as the BNP opens doors to Beijing, significant segments of Bangladeshi society view Chinese debt-financed infrastructure with suspicion, remembering Sri Lanka's Hambantota experience. Internal divisions run deep: the Awami League's supporters haven't disappeared, Yunus's interim government maintains its own vision of balanced foreign policy, and civil society groups actively debate the terms of Chinese engagement. Bangladesh's choices reflect domestic political calculations as much as external pressure. The question is whether these internal checks will prove sufficient to prevent the country from becoming another node in Beijing's network—or whether economic necessity and anti-India sentiment will override concerns about Chinese influence.

The Pakistan Factor: 1971 Undone

Next comes Pakistan, where conditions only deepen the problem.

Half a century of silence followed the 1971 conflict between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The wounds of violence during Bangladesh’s breakaway remained too deep for Dhaka to overlook. Now, unexpectedly, distance gives way to cautious contact. Change moves quicker than anyone expected.

Now Turkey steps in behind the scenes. Efforts led by Erdogan aim to rebuild ties between Islamabad and Dhaka, progress is visible. After Hasina’s fall, Pakistan voiced support without delay. Long-closed diplomatic paths begin to thaw. From this shift, a loose alignment of Pakistan, Turkey, and Bangladesh takes shape. For India, the change brings pressure from two directions at once.

If Pakistan’s ISI resumes using Bangladeshi soil, something seen often in the 1990s under prior BNP rule, India could confront a real challenge across three directions. From the north, China applies pressure along the frontier. In the west, Pakistan remains an enduring concern. To the east, Bangladesh might turn unfriendly, possibly harboring forces aimed at India’s weakest areas.

India's Neighborhood Strategy Collapses

This is the pattern across India's neighborhood. The Maldives turned hostile in 2024. Sri Lanka's debt burden to China has effectively compromised its autonomy. Nepal cycles through unstable coalition governments increasingly responsive to Beijing's interests. Myanmar's military regime survives largely on Chinese backing amid ongoing civil conflict. Bhutan stands alone as India's remaining reliable partner in the region.

Why has India's neighborhood diplomacy failed so completely? The answer lies in structural problems. New Delhi habitually throws its weight behind sitting governments while ignoring opposition movements—then acts surprised when those oppositions eventually take power and remember the slight. The 2024 Bangladesh crisis exemplifies this: India had minimal contact with BNP during Hasina's fifteen-year rule, assuming the Awami League's dominance would continue indefinitely.

India also tends to condition its assistance on democratic reforms and human rights improvements, delivering lectures that neighbors find patronizing. China takes the opposite approach—no political strings attached, just rapid infrastructure delivery that works. This matters to governments prioritizing development over democratic niceties.

Domestic politics handcuff Indian foreign policy in ways that Beijing never experiences. West Bengal's chief minister blocks any Teesta water agreement with Bangladesh, protecting local farmers regardless of national strategic interests. Assam's political dynamics prevent pragmatic border arrangements. China's authoritarian system suffers no such constraints—Xi Jinping decides, and the policy happens.

The broader implications extend beyond South Asia. Bangladesh's February 12 election may mark a turning point not just for India, but for democratic powers everywhere attempting to compete with authoritarian rivals in the Global South. China's model—rapid infrastructure delivery, no political conditions, no democratic lectures, no domestic veto points—proves systematically more attractive to developing nations than India's slower, conditional, democratically constrained approach. This isn't about corruption or coercion; it's about structural advantages that authoritarian systems possess when conducting infrastructure diplomacy.

Democracies require parliamentary debates, environmental reviews, constituency management, and coalition politics before committing to projects. China's Xi decides, and construction begins. Democracies attach conditions about governance, transparency, and human rights that recipients find intrusive. China asks only for economic partnership. Democracies struggle to maintain consistent policies across election cycles and coalition changes. China's foreign policy remains stable across decades. In the competition for influence in developing nations, these aren't minor differences—they're decisive advantages.

The question Bangladesh forces India—and by extension, every democratic power—to confront is whether liberal democracies can compete effectively with authoritarian infrastructure diplomacy in regions where development trumps democracy, where speed matters more than process, and where sovereignty concerns make political conditions unwelcome. If the answer is no, then the global balance of power will continue shifting toward Beijing not through military conquest but through patient economic engagement that democracies structurally cannot match.

As Bangladesh votes on February 12, India confronts this reality in its most painful form. The country it helped liberate in 1971 is now positioned to become another node in China's strategic encirclement. India can neither prevent this outcome nor escape its consequences. The northeastern states will grow more vulnerable. The Indian Ocean will increasingly become a Chinese sphere of influence. February 12 may not answer whether democracies can compete with autocracies in their own neighborhoods, but it will make the question unavoidable—and the early evidence suggests the answer democratic powers least want to hear.

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BY APOORVA

Apoorva, a Class 12 student at DPS Dwarka, combines his passion for geopolitics with aspirations to study law. He closely follows South Asian security dynamics and international strategic developments.

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